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The beef industry’s share of domestic meat demand continues to decline, as increasing vertical 
coordination in pork and poultry contribute to these industries’ ability to offer convenient, 
consistent, and less expensive products.  For such vertical coordination to be effective, incentives 
must be properly aligned so that those responsible for making the most important investments for 
system profitability are appropriately compensated.  This study demonstrates that cow-calf 
producers who invest in quality registered cattle and those who are interested in incorporating 
feedlot and carcass data into herd management decisions are also more interested in retained 
ownership. 
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The beef industry’s share of domestic meat demand is declining, as pork and poultry offer 
increasingly convenient, consistent, and less expensive products (Gillespie, Basarir, and Schupp 
(2004).  At one time, pork and poultry markets were much like the beef industry with cash 
market transactions dominating between successive stages in the supply chain (Rhodes 1995).  
Each of these industries faces similar challenges in transforming commodities into retail products 
that meet specific consumer demands.  Specifically, uncertainty regarding producer effort and/or 
the quality of the animal prior to slaughter and price risk impede product consistency and 
keeping retail prices low (Martinez 2002).  Various forms of increasingly tighter vertical 
coordination have been adopted in response to these issues, with the pork and poultry industries 
leading the way in coordinating product consistency.   
Vertical linkages in agricultural supply chains are coming under increasing scrutiny, as 
efforts to enhance coordination become more common (Vukina et al. 2007).  Applications of 
property rights theory (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990) suggest that various 
forms of vertical coordination adopted in pork and poultry industries are responses intended to 
incentivize optimal investment or effort and to economize on monitoring and other transaction 
costs.  Under tournament contracts, poultry producers are paid based on productive efficiencies 
(e.g., feed gain and minimal death loss) relative to peers, while integrators bear the common 
production risk much of which depends on their decisions regarding chick genetics and ration 
formulations (Knoeber 1989; Knoeber and Thurman 1995; Vukina and Leegomonchai 2006).  
Similarly, the use of alliances, contracts, and vertical ownership of the supply chain in the hog 
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industry has been shown to depend upon the characteristics of investments at different stages and 
their importance for system profitability (Cozzarin and Westgren 2000; Reimer 2006).   
Here, we argue that retained ownership by cow-calf producers also represents an 
augmentation of a traditional supply chain and that, like other organizational forms in poultry 
and pork markets, this marketing alternative may induce optimal producer investments in animal 
quality.  Much of the prior research on retained ownership is normative, identifying when 
producers should consider retained ownership based on variations in differences between current 
and expected future profits and their aversion to risk (e.g., Schroeder and Featherstone 1990; 
McKissick, and Ikerd 1996; Van Tassel, McNeley, MacNeil, Short, and Grings 1997).  Other 
research finds price differentials (i.e., live weight versus dressed weight and grade; auction 
versus grid pricing) consistent with risk premiums for cattle of unknown quality, which may 
suggest opportunities for producers of above average quality cattle to benefit from retained 
ownership (e.g., Fausti and Feuz 1995; White, Anderson, McKinley, and Parish 2007).  While 
Gillespie, Basarir, and Schupp (2004) find that retained ownership is statistically more likely for 
younger producers and producers regularly in contact with extension agents, little is known about 
what producer attributes contribute to use of retained ownership. 
  Using 2008 survey data on 188 Missouri cattle producers, we examined linkages between 
producer characteristics, interest in feedlot and carcass data and in retained ownership, and actual 
retained ownership in a structural equation model (SEM) framework (Bollen 1989).  The SEM 
allows us to trace the path of effects from producer characteristics to interest in retained 
ownership and subsequently to retained ownership practices.  Results indicate that younger 
producers and producers that have registered cattle (an indicator of quality), as well as those that 3 
 
are interested in performance based management using feedlot and carcass data are more 
interested in retained ownership. 
  The article is organized as follows.  The next section reviews the literature on retained 
ownership.  Then, the data and research design are discussed, followed by a description of the 
SEM approach employed. Subsequently, results are presented, followed by concluding remarks. 
 
Previous Literature 
Schroeder and Featherstone (1990) applied an expected utility-maximizing discrete stochastic 
programming model to calf retention and marketing decisions for cow-calf producers, using 
steer, heifer, and corn prices as stochastic variables.  Results showed that retention decisions 
depend on current profit, expected future profit distributions, pricing alternatives available (cash, 
hedging, and options), and the producers’ aversion to price risk.  “The decision of whether to 
retain calves will be related to the current cash price the producer could receive by selling his 
calves, the producer's expectations regarding future prices, production and opportunity costs, 
pricing alternatives available, and his aversion to risk” (p. 1029). 
  Using a similar discrete stochastic programming model as Schroeder and Featherstone 
(1990), Van Tassel, et al. (1997) modeled optimal retained ownership decisions.  Retained 
ownership decreased with profit realization at the decision point, producers’ risk aversion, and 
growing season precipitation, and increased with growth potential based on sires’ expected 
progeny differences (EPDs) for yearling weight. 
As noted by Marsh (1999, p. 336), “retaining ownership through finishing … has become 
an increasingly important value-added option for producers marketing quality cattle.”  Using 
data on 218 pens of five steers from a South Dakota Retained Ownership Demonstration Project 4 
 
that were marketed on dressed weight and grade, Fausti and Feuz (1995) detected premiums of 
$9.22/head and $6.74/head over cattle sold on live and dressed weight bases, respectively,  
indicative of risk aversion among cattle buyers facing quality uncertainty for non-graded cattle.  
Similarly, White, et al. (2007) detected risk premiums between $31/head to$75/head charged by 
buyers at traditional auction markets over cattle purchased through grid pricing and concluded, 
“Producers of cattle with known feedlot performance, carcass potential, or both might be better 
off retaining ownership of their calves or marketing them in a way that communicates the 
information … directly to the buyer” (p. 87). 
Gillespie, Basarir, and Schupp (2004) examined Louisiana cattle producers’ marketing 
methods, including conventional auctions, private treaties, video auctions, retained ownership 
and strategic alliances.  In general, producers using methods other than traditional auctions 
where younger and had larger and more diverse farming operations, heavier weaning weights, 
greater contact with county extension agents, and less dependence on off-farm income sources.  
For retained ownership, specifically, only the effects of age and contact with extension agent 
variables were statistically significant. 
 
Research Design 
In May 2008, a survey was sent out to 1200 Missouri cow-calf producers regarding management 
and marketing practices. The mailing list comprised producers that participate in the Show-Me-
Select (SMS) replacement heifer program and a second mailing list purchased from Survey 
Sampling International.  Of the 1200 surveys distributed, 200 were returned with address 
unknown, and 266 were returned with responses.  Four of the responding producers indicated 
that they had retired.  Several of the surveys were only partially completed, and for the questions 
used in this analysis, 188 usable observations were available.  5 
 
Summary statistics indicate that the sample is representative of Missouri producers in 
terms of age but are larger herds on average (Table 1).  The average age of the survey 
respondents is within a year of the average age for Missouri beef cattle producers (57.3) reported 
by the United States Department of Agriculture’s 2007 Census of Agriculture.  The average herd 
size of 169 cows is much larger than the average range for Missouri of 30 to 35 head (Missouri 
Agricultural Statistics Service Farm Facts).  Some producers have no bulls indicating that they 
either rely on artificial insemination or borrow or rent other producers’ bulls.  The herds seem to 
be heavily influenced by the Black Angus breed, as 64 percent of calves are black on average.  
The average producer retains ownership while backgrounding up to 60 days post weaning, as 
indicated by the mean statistic of 3.16.  (See the footnote of Table 1 for the coding of this 
variable.)  As shown in Figure 1, however, the largest portion of respondents retain ownership 
more than 60 days post-weaning (37 percent), while substantial portions sell shortly after 
weaning (21percent) and others retain ownership until harvest of the calves (14 percent).  This 
question pertains to maintaining ownership of calves and does not distinguish between calves 
fed-out on-farm and other forms of retained ownership where calves are fed-out in a feedlot. 
  About 36 percent of the sample was interested in retaining ownership through a feedlot, 
as indicated by the mean statistic reported for this binary variable in Table 1.  A smaller portion 
of the sample had actually co-mingled their calves with other producers’ calves prior to selling 
(19 percent).  Similarly, only 20 percent of the population had registered cattle.  Over twice that 
many had purebred cattle, and over half of the sample was interested in using carcass and feedlot 
data in cow herd management decisions. 
  Correlations are presented in Table 2.  Consistent with Gillespie, Basarir, and Schupp’s 
(2004) finding, age is negatively correlated with interest in and length of actual retained 6 
 
ownership.  Similarly, age is negatively correlated with interest in feedlot and carcass data.  The 
three measures of scale (cows, bulls, and recent bull purchases) are strongly correlated, but their 
correlation with other variables is often small in magnitude.  Length of retained ownership is 
positively correlated with co-mingling calves and interest in retained ownership and interest in 
feedlot and carcass data.  While registered cattle and purebred cattle are correlated, their 
correlations with these other variables are generally opposite in sign.  The only notable 
correlation for % Black Calves is the negative relationship with Purebred Cattle. 
 
Empirical Methods 
Following Pennings and Leuthold (2000), a covariance structure model or structural equation 
model (SEM) is expressed as: 
  δ ξ + Λ =
x x  (1) 
  ε η + Λ =
y y  (2) 
  ς ξ η η + + = Γ B . (3) 
Equations (1) and (2) are factor-analytic measurement models that tie observable indicants to 
unobservable latent constructs.  The q × 1 vector x contains measures of the exogenous 
constructs in the n × 1 vector ξ , while the p × 1 vector y contains measures of the endogenous 
constructs in the m × 1 vector η .  The coefficient matrices 
x Λ  and 
y Λ  relate x to ξ  and y to η , 
respectively, with measurement errors represented by the vectors δ  and ε .  Equation (3) is the 
path model that expresses the relationships among the constructs.  The coefficient matrix B 
denotes the effects of endogenous constructs on each other, while the coefficient matrix  Γ  
denotes the effects of exogenous constructs on endogenous constructs.  The vector of 
disturbances ς  represents errors in equations.  Best practices for implementing SEMs, as 7 
 
summarized by McDonald and Ho (2002), are followed here.  Empirical results for are reported 
in the following section.   
 The literature reviewed herein indicates that retained ownership is an increasingly 
important value-added option for producers marketing quality cattle (Marsh 1999; White, et al. 
2007).  Hence, we hypothesize that higher quality cattle enhances (interest in) retained 
ownership.  Producers may manage their herds not only based on genetics or pedigree, but also 
based on performance.  Hence, we hypothesize that interest in using feedlot and carcass data for 
herd management is associated with (interest in) retained ownership.  To ascertain such effects, 
other factors likely need to be controlled for, such as scale, producer age, and cattle breed.  
Gillespie, Basarir, and Schupp (2004) did not find scale to be a significant predictor of retained 
ownership.  Summary statistics suggested that proportional use of retained ownership was largest 
among the smallest (1 to 19 head) and largest (over 100 head) scale segments of their sample.  
While the authors found age to be a significantly negative predictor of retained ownership, they 
noted that the effect was indeterminate a priori.  Older, more experienced cattle producers may 
be expected to recognize the advantages of alternative marketing arrangements, or as in the case 
of technology adoption, may be slower to adopt newer marketing procedures. 
 
Empirical Results 
Abbreviated SEM results are presented in Figure 2.  (Full results, including error variances are 
available from the authors upon request.)  The model is designed to trace the path of effects of 
various producer characteristics on interest in retained ownership and, subsequently, on actual 8 
 
retained ownership and co-mingling of calves.
1  While the model fit is somewhat less than ideal 
(Root Mean Squared Error = 0.1970), this is notably the first attempt to model retained 
ownership as a function of producers cattle quality and interests in performance-based 
management.  Marginal effects cannot be inferred from SEM results, but the standardized 
coefficients presented here provide insight into the relative magnitude or importance of effects. 
Consistent with Gillespie, Basarir, and Schupp (2004), the sign of the coefficient on Age 
is negative, but the same level of statistical significance is not found here (P-value = 0.1472).  
Also as in the previous study, Scale has a small, positive, but statistically insignificant impact.  A 
subtle nuance is that here these variables influence Interest in Retained Ownership, whereas they 
directly influence actual retained ownership in Gillespie, Basarir, and Schupp (2004).  Here, the 
percentage of calves that had a solid black coat also has a statistically insignificant effect. 
 Interestingly,  Registered Cattle, a proxy for quality cattle, significantly increases Interest 
in Retained Ownership, while Purebred Cattle has a significantly negative impact.  While 
purebred cattle may also be high quality, animals destined for slaughter are of interest here, and 
purebred producers more likely provide seed-stock to other producers or, as Gillespie, Basarir, 
and Schupp (2004) suggest, sell directly to persons involved in 4-H programs. Alternatively, 
producers of purebred cattle may not emphasize quality as much in their management, 
particularly if the producers don’t own registered animals.  The results also suggest that 
producers who are interested in using feedlot and carcass data for herd management decisions are 
likely more interested in retained ownership.  Intuitively, interest in retained ownership through a 
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feedlot significantly increases the length of actual retained ownership and the associated co-
mingling of cattle in feedlots.  These effects are of notable magnitude and are statistically 
significant at the one and five percent levels, respectively. 
 
Conclusions 
This study utilizes cow-calf producer survey data and structural equation modeling to limit 
measurement error and trace the path effects of various producer characteristics on interest in and 
actual use of retained ownership.  While the analysis is consistent in some respects with an 
earlier study on retained ownership (Gillespie, Basarir, and Schupp 2004), further insights are 
gained regarding the impacts of cattle quality and interest in performance-based management.  
Cattle quality, as measured by ownership of registered cattle, significantly increases interest in 
retained ownership, which itself is significantly associated with actual retained ownership and 
co-mingling of calves.  Similarly, interest in performance-based management as measured by 
interest in feedlot and carcass data, is significantly associated with interest in retained ownership.   
These results are consistent with an incentives-based argument that ownership supports 
producer investments in cattle quality and management effort.  In the vastly more vertically 
integrated pork and poultry industries, similar arguments are employed to explain the observed 
vertical organization of supply chains.  For instance, Cozzarin and Westgren (2000) find that, 
within alliances in the hog industry, claims to residual rents should be shifted from finishing 
units to farrowing units, the stage which most impacts system profits.  Future research on vertical 
supply arrangements in the beef industry may apply similar theoretical approaches as currently 
used in the hog and poultry market research, such as transaction cost economics (Williamson) 
and property rights theory (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990). 10 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
 
Maximum Minimum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Continuous Variables        
Age (years)  91.00  21.00  56.94  13.68 
Cows (head)  1250.00  4.00  169.01  171.10 
Bulls (head)  300.00  0.00  8.29  22.86 
Recent Bull Purchases (head)  40.00  0.00  4.80  5.61 
% Black Calves  100.00  0.00  64.00  29.00 
Length of Retained Ownership  5.00  1.00  3.16  1.35 
        
Binary Variables (=1 if yes)         
Interest in Retained Ownership  1.00  0.00  0.36  0.48 
Co-Mingle Cattle  1.00  0.00  0.19  0.39 
Registered Cattle   1.00  0.00  0.20  0.40 
Purebred Cattle  1.00  0.00  0.46  0.50 
Interest in Feedlot Data  1.00  0.00  0.64  0.48 
Interest in Carcass Data  1.00  0.00  0.69  0.46 
Note:  n = 188.  Length of Retained Ownership equals 1 if producer sells within 2 weeks of 
weaning, 2 if producer sells after a pre-conditioning program, 3 if producer sells after 
backgrounding up to 60 days post weaning, 4 if producer sells after backgrounding more than 60 
days post weaning, and 5 if producer sells when calves are harvested.  This question includes 
both cattle fed-out on-farm and retained ownership through a feedlot.  The binary variable 
Interest in Retained Ownership pertains only to retained ownership through a feedlot.  Mean 











Table 2. Correlations. 




















Cows 0.03  1.00 
Bulls 0.10*  0.65*** 1.00 
Recent Bull Purchases  0.07 0.80*** 0.40*** 1.00 
Registered Cattle   0.00  -0.01  0.14** -0.14**  1.00 
Purebred Cattle   0.02  -0.10*  0.04  -0.18*** 0.46*** 1.00 
Length of R.O.  -0.07  -0.05  0.04  -0.03  0.07  -0.13** 1.00 
Interest in R.O.  -0.15**  0.05  0.09  0.01  0.13**  -0.05  0.36*** 1.00 
Interest in Feedlot Data  -0.17*** 0.06  0.06  0.00  0.20*** -0.07  0.26*** 0.35*** 1.00 
Interest in Carcass Data  -0.22*** 0.12** 0.08  0.07  0.16**  -0.08  0.33*** 0.31*** 0.83*** 1.00 
Co-Mingle Cattle  -0.06  -0.02  0.15** 0.01  0.10*  0.01  0.09*  0.17*** 0.11*  0.12**  1.00 
% Black Calves  0.01  0.03  0.06  -0.05  -0.03  -0.12** -0.06  0.01  0.10*  0.08  -0.07  1.00 
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Note: n =188.  χ
2(56) = 462.25 and Root Mean Squared Error = 0.1970.  ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.  Reported statistics are 
standardized coefficients, indicative of the magnitude of each variable’s relative impact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 